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Abstract
Electronic communications devices intended for government or military applications
must be rigorously evaluated to ensure that they maintain data confidentiality. High-
grade information security evaluations require a detailed analysis of the device’s design,
to determine how it achieves necessary security functions. In practice, such evaluations
are labour-intensive and costly, so there is a strong incentive to find ways to make the
process more efficient. In this paper we show how well-known concepts from graph
theory can be applied to a device’s design to optimise information security evaluations.
In particular, we use end-to-end graph traversals to eliminate components that do not
need to be evaluated at all, and minimal cutsets to identify the smallest group of com-
ponents that needs to be evaluated in depth.
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Security evaluations
ACM Classification areas: K.6.5 Management of Computing and Informa-
tion Systems—Security and Protection; C.2.0 Computer-Communication Networks—
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1 Introduction
Electronic communications devices safeguard classified information in government and
military networks. In particular, domain separation devices allow the flow of information
between high and low-security domains to be controlled. Examples of such devices include
data diodes, multi-computer switches, context filters and cryptographic devices.
Before such a device can be deployed, however, it must be carefully evaluated to ensure
that it provides the necessary security functionality. We are particularly interested in ‘high-
grade’ information security evaluations, which include a detailed analysis of the device’s
design.
International standards already exist for information security evaluations. Two es-
pecially influential standards are the Information Technology Security Evaluation Crite-
ria (Commission of the EC 1991) and the more recent Common Criteria for Informa-
tion Technology Security Evaluation (Common Criteria 1999a). However, while these
general standards provide helpful frameworks for managing evaluations, their accompa-
nying methodologies (Commission of the EC 1993, Common Criteria 1999b) do not in-
clude specific techniques for undertaking evaluations at high security levels. For instance,
the evaluation methodology for the seven-layered Common Criteria standard (Common
Criteria 1999b) covers the lowest four security levels only.
1
Lacking detailed technical guidance, evaluators of information security devices in-
tended for critical applications must therefore take a very conservative approach. In the
worst case, this may involve careful scrutiny of every component within a device, to deter-
mine both how it contributes to the device’s security functionality, if at all, and the secu-
rity consequences of its failure, if any. In practice, such evaluations are time-consuming,
labour-intensive and costly.
Our goal in this paper, therefore, is to show how the evaluation process can be made
more efficient, by prioritising the components to be studied. In effect, our approach for-
malises the notion of a ‘security perimeter’ (Young 1991). Specifically, we exploit well-
known principles from graph theory to:
• eliminate components that do not need to be evaluated at all, because they do not lie
on a critical information-flow path; and
• choose components for detailed evaluation, based on whether or not they form crucial
links between the high and low-security domains.
The concepts are illustrated through a small case study involving evaluation of a crypto-
graphic device for potential breaches of (overt) data confidentiality.
2 Device Model
We assume a simple generic model of the device being evaluated, consisting merely of
a graph of components linked by connections. The level of detail in the model is not
significant. It may be a block diagram, with only a few components, or an electronic
schematic diagram, with dozens of components. For our purposes we merely view it as a
directed graph of nodes and arcs.
The connections may carry, and the components may contain or generate, information.
Certain components may act as information sinks, and others as information sources. Typ-
ically the aim of a security evaluation is to determine what kinds of information can reach
sinks in a ‘low-security’ domain from sources in a ‘high-security’ one.
2.1 Information Model
For the purposes of the case study in Section 3 we assume that the information manipulated
by components and connections is categorised as follows.
• A data connection is one that may carry information that is meaningful in the external
security domains. In particular, it may carry classified information. Similarly, a
‘data’ component may contain or generate information that is meaningful externally.
• A control connection carries information that is meaningful only to the components
within the device being evaluated. Control connections are not usually considered
capable of carrying classified information. Similarly for ‘control’ components.
If a connection or component is capable of manipulating both data and control information,
or if we are unsure what kind of information it handles, then we conservatively classify it
to be of ‘data’ type since this is the most worrisome category from a security perspective.
The information manipulated by connections and components may also be categorised
according to its security level (Committee on NSS 2003).
• A red connection is one that may carry classified information, i.e., information orig-
inating from a high-security source. Similarly, a ‘red’ component is one which may
contain or produce classified information.
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Figure 1: Typical Network Configuration for Cryptographic Devices
• A black connection carries unclassifed information only, typically originating from
the low-security domain. Similarly, ‘black’ components are those that contain and
generate unclassified information only.
Combinations of red/black and data/control information types are possible. Typically,
an information security evaluator’s primary concern is to trace the flow of red data infor-
mation. (Red control information may be of interest during covert channel analyses, as
discussed in Section 5.) Black information is usually considered to be of minor interest
only.
2.2 Component Model
We also assume that the components within the device can be categorised according to
their effect on the flow of information. They can be viewed as functions from the infor-
mation appearing on their input connections to the information produced on their output
connections. Some typical types of component are as follows.
• A buffer has an input connection and an output connection. The buffer transfers its
input’s information to its output with no significant alteration (other than the delay
induced by passage through the buffer). Buffers are of relatively little importance
during information security evaluations since they allow red data to pass through
without hindrance.
• A switch typically has an input control connection, and both an input and an output
data connection. Information flow from the data input to the data output is deter-
mined by the control input. Switches evaluated in isolation are not usually helpful
in determining the flow of red data, but they are significant because they may divide
the overall security argument into a number of different cases, one for each of the
control values.
• A downgrader lowers the security significance of its inputs. Typically it will have a
red input and a black output. Examples include context filters and encryption compo-
nents. Downgraders are especially helpful during security evaluations because they
may act as sinks for red data, and may thus prevent it from reaching the low-security
domain.
• An upgrader raises the security significance of its inputs. Typically it will have a
black input and a red output. Examples include key and password generators, and
decryption components. Upgraders are important for security evaluations because
they may act as sources of red data that could eventually reach the low-security do-
main.
Often it will not be immediately obvious into which of these categories a given compo-
nent belongs. It is the security evaluator’s task to assign a category to each of the significant
components, as part of the overall security argument.
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Figure 2: The Cryptographic Device
3 Case Study
In this section we introduce a particular domain-separation device to serve as an illustrative
example for the evaluation techniques presented in Section 4.
3.1 A Cryptographic Device
We consider a prototype ‘cryptographic device’ (Graves 2003), which encrypts plaintext
characters received from a local computer and sends the resulting encrypted characters to a
communications network. It also decrypts encrypted characters received from the network
and forwards the resulting plaintext characters to the local computer. The device uses one
of several different encryption algorithms, depending on its operating mode. It changes
encryption and decryption modes in response to special control characters received from
the computer and network, respectively.
In a typical configuration, as shown in Figure 1, such devices are used in pairs to al-
low high-security computers to communicate over a low-security network. Notice that the
cryptographic devices themselves reside in high-security domains.
The particular device of interest is shown in Figure 2. Its rear panel houses a DC power
input socket, and two RS232 serial data sockets for connecting to the local computer and the
network. The front panel houses a number of switches and indicators, including the power
switch and LED. The device can operate in any of four cryptographic modes, including a
non-encrypting ‘bypass’ mode. The three ‘mode’ LEDs tell the operator which encryption
mode is active, if any.
The device also has an integral self-diagnosis capability, intended to ensure that clas-
sified information is being encrypted correctly. If the device detects a problem with the
encryption process it shuts itself down and illuminates a ‘fault’ LED. From this state the
operator can restart the device by pressing the ‘fault reset’ button. Finally, so that the
operator can test the device’s self-diagnosis feature, a ‘fault insert’ switch is provided to
deliberately cause the internal check to fail—activating the fault insert switch should cause
the device to immediately shut down.
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Figure 3: Initial Block Diagram of the Cryptographic Device
3.2 Initial Block Diagram
A block diagram of the cryptographic device is shown in Figure 3. Solid lines represent
‘data’ connections and dashed lines represent ‘control’ connections. Unidirectional con-
nections are shown with arrows; other connections are assumed to be bidirectional.
The diagram is closely based on one in the device’s technical documentation (Graves
2003). (It omits the device’s power circuitry and associated components.) The level of
abstraction varies in the figure. Some of the components shown represent individual elec-
tronic components (e.g., component I is a single physical switch), whereas others represent
entire circuits (e.g., componentG comprises nine logic gates). Similarly, some of the con-
nections represent individual pin-to-pin wires (e.g., from circuit C to LED J), while others
are sets of parallel wires (e.g., the parallel connection from microprocessor E to circuit G
carries an eight-bit byte from an output port on the microprocessor).
As a starting point, we have assumed here that the components on the device’s pe-
riphery, and their associated connections, are already well understood. For instance, it is
reasonable to expect that a connection to one of the LEDs on the front panel (e.g., compo-
nent J) consists of an outgoing ‘control’ signal. Similarly, we expect that the RS232-to-
TTL converters (e.g., componentA) produce incoming ‘data’ values.
However, we assume that the device’s internal behaviour has yet to be evaluated from a
security perspective. Thus, all internal connections are shown as bidirectional and capable
of carrying classified information, and all internal components are assumed to potentially
contain classified information, until it can be proven otherwise.
3.3 Functionality
In this section we summarise the device’s overall behaviour, as described in its accompa-
nying documentation (Graves 2003).
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Components A and B in Figure 3 together form the device’s connection to the high-
security computer. They convert between the serial RS232 bit stream and the TTL voltages
used within the device. Importantly, component A is assumed to be a source of red data
from the high-security domain. Similarly, componentsM andN comprise the connection
to the low-security network. In particular, component M is assumed to be a data sink
leading to the low-security domain.
Components I , J , K and L are the switches and indicators on the cryptographic de-
vice’s front panel. Their connections are all assumed to carry red control values, because
the components manipulate simple signals only and because they all reside within the high-
security domain.
The device’s behaviour is largely under the control of microprocessor E. Under nor-
mal circumstances, classified information from incoming RS232 converter A is passed to
microprocessor E for encryption. The resulting encrypted information is then sent into
data buffer H , and from there to outgoing RS232 converter M to be forwarded to the
low-security domain.
The classified information is encrypted by software within the microprocessor, using
one of three algorithms, depending on the device’s encryption mode. However, in the
fourth ‘bypass’ mode classified information from componentA is allowed directly through
bufferH to outputM without encryption.
In the opposite direction, unclassified information received by converter N is sent to
microprocessor E for decryption by one of the three algorithms. The result is then for-
warded to buffer F , and from there to the high-security domain via output B. Again, the
bypass mode allows information to flow directly fromN to F to B, without decryption.
The remaining components are all associated with the device’s self-diagnosis capabil-
ity. Redundant microprocessor D duplicates all encryption of classified information per-
formed by microprocessor E. (Ideally this would be done using independently-developed
software.) Both microprocessors send each encrypted character to ‘comparison logic’ cir-
cuit G, which produces a signal indicating whether or not the characters match.
This signal is interpreted by ‘shutdown’ circuitC, which, if a mismatch is detected, tells
data bufferH not to forward information to the low-security domain. In addition, fault in-
sertion switch L and reset switch I allow the operator to control the self-diagnosis features
as described above. (For clarity we have separated switch L from logic component G,
although the device’s detailed schematic diagram (Graves 2003) reveals that the switch is
actually embedded within the logic circuitry.) Finally, the D–C and E–C connections are
used to synchronise the microprocessors’ outputs with the shutdown circuitry.
Even at the block-diagram level, the device’s design is complex. Ultimately, however, a
high-grade information security evaluation must proceed down to the level of the device’s
schematic circuit diagram and microprocessor software. Therefore, the practical challenge
is how to determine which parts of the device need to be studied in depth and which can be
ignored or treated cursorily.
4 Techniques for Identifying Critical Components
Given a device model such as that in Figure 3, an information security evaluator needs to
determine whether or not information from a ‘red data’ source can reach a data sink in the
low-security domain. Doing so efficiently is aided by having ways of eliminating irrele-
vant components, and deciding which is likely to be the most efficient order for evaluating
components.
4.1 Eliminating Irrelevant Components
The first thing the evaluator wants to do to simplify the evaluation task is to eliminate com-
ponents that do not need to be examined at all. We therefore observe that those components
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Figure 4: Potentially Security-Critical Components
that may have security significance can be defined as those that lie on an information flow
path from a red data source to a data sink in the low-security domain. This is the largest set
of components that the security evaluator will need to analyse, in the worst case.
In Figure 3, for instance, two possible sources of red data are incoming RS232 con-
verter A, which is in the high-security domain, and microprocessor E, which acts as an
upgrader when decrypting information. The only sink for information going to the low-
security domain is outgoing RS232 converter M . (Switches I and L are sources of red
control signals only, so we ignore them for now, but see the discussion on covert channels
in Section 5.) Therefore, we are interested in all components on paths from componentsA
and E to component M . Relevant paths include the following. (There is no need to list
paths that iterate around the same loop, e.g.,D, C, G, D, more than once.)
• A,D, C, G, E, H ,M
• A,D, C, H ,M
• A,D, G, E,H , M
• A, E, H ,M
• E,H ,M
The union of the components in these paths then gives us the largest set of potentially
security-critical components: A, C, D, E, G, H and M . These components are shown
in Figure 4, with all other components and their associated connections omitted. Figure 4
thus isolates the security-critical part of the block diagram in Figure 3.
This simple technique quickly reduces the number of components to be evaluated. In
general, it eliminates the following types of component:
• Components whose outputs cannot reach the low-security domain. In our example
buffer F and RS232 converterB may both potentially receive classified information
from microprocessorE, but they can nevertheless be eliminated because their outputs
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Figure 5: Reevaluated Block Diagram
return to the high-security domain. (Similarly, LEDs J andK can be eliminated both
because they reside within the high-security domain and because we are assuming
that their control-valued inputs are not security-critical.)
• Components whose inputs cannot originate from a red data source. In Figure 3 the
only such component is RS232 converterN , whose sole input comes from the low-
security domain.
4.2 Identifying the Most Critical Components
The evaluator’s job can also be made easier by prioritising the components to be examined
in depth. In particular, we observe that a simple and potentially highly-efficient approach
is to adopt the graph’s minimal cutset as the first group of components to be evaluated.
Recall that the cutset of a graph is a set of nodes whose removal will make the graph dis-
joint (Provan and Shier 1996). A minimal cutset is such a set with the smallest cardinality.
(There may be more than one minimal cutset for a given graph.)
In our application we are interested in cutsets where one partition contains all red data
sources and the other partition contains all data sinks in the low-security domain. This is
an attractive approach because if it can be shown that the components in the minimal cutset
achieve security domain separation, then the evaluation need proceed no further. In many
cases, therefore, evaluating the minimal cutset first will result in evaluation of the smallest
possible set of components.
In Figure 4, we want to find a cutset that separates red data sources A and E from
low-security data sink M . In this case there is a unique, singleton minimal cutset consist-
ing of data buffer H . In other words, if we can show that this single component blocks
transmission of red data then the entire security evaluation is complete.
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4.3 Evaluating a Component
The next step is to evaluate the security-critical components in the chosen cutset. The goal
is to show that these components have the necessary security functionality, i.e., that they are
all either downgraders or data sinks. If so, then the evaluation can stop because the device
is guaranteed not to send red data to the low-security domain. Otherwise the results of the
component evaluations are inserted back into the diagram and the whole process repeats.
Above we identified buffer H as the first component worthy of close examination. A
study of the cryptographic device’s documentation for the buffer (Graves 2003) reveals
that it is composed of two parts. The first, a ‘data bypass’ circuitO, forwards characters re-
ceived either from microprocessorE or directly from RS232 converterA. It also responds
to a signal from microprocessor E which controls the release of characters, depending on
the encryption mode. The second component, a ‘shutdown gate’ P , can block the trans-
mission of characters to the low-security domain, as directed by shutdown circuit C.
Figure 5 shows the block diagram with newly-evaluated components O and P in-
serted in place of component H . The previously assumed bidirectional data connection
between E and H is now known to consist of two separate unidirectional connections to
component O, one carrying (potentially red) data and the other carrying a control signal.
Similarly, the connection between components C and H is now known to be a control
signal sent by component C.
Continuing the evaluation, we note that the minmal cutset of Figure 5 consists of com-
ponent P alone. The device’s schematic diagram (Graves 2003) reveals that component P
is a single tristate buffer gate with an inverted enable input. It may thus allow data to pass
straight through, depending on the disabling signal from shutdown circuit C. (Notably,
since this control signal is an inhibitory one, a failure in circuit C would allow compo-
nent P to forward potentially classified information to the low-security domain!)
Therefore, componentP alone is insufficient to guarantee security. We can thus remove
it from the graph and connect component O directly to componentM . (The C–P control
signal is assumed here not to be capable of carrying red data and can also be eliminated.)
Reevaluating the resulting graph then gives us a minimal cutset consisting of compo-
nents E and O. The device’s detailed schematic shows that data bypass circuit O consists
of three logic gates and acts as a switch (with two data inputs) under the control of micro-
processor E. Again, therefore, this circuit alone is insufficient to guarantee security.
Thus, our final conclusion is that the ultimate responsibility for the flow of information
from red data sourceA to data sinkM rests with the software running on microprocessorE.
This program will therefore need to be subjected to careful scrutiny to ensure that it enables
the release of classified information appropriately. (Relevant information-flow analysis
techniques for security software exist (Avvenuti et al. 2003), but are outside the scope of
this paper.)
Pleasingly, this final outcome matches our intuitions about the device’s design. In its
three main encryption modes, microprocessorE is meant to act as a downgrader, effectively
stopping the flow of red data, and thereby establishing the necessary security functional-
ity. In the fourth ‘bypass’ mode, microprocessor E again has responsibility for correctly
authorising componentO to release (unencrypted) red data.
Most importantly, with respect to Figure 3, the overall evaluation process did not require
us to examine microprocessorD, circuits F , C andG, or componentsB,N , I , J ,K and L
in any depth, thus saving the security evaluator a considerable amount of work.
4.4 A Generic Security Evaluation Process
Abstracting from the case study above allows us to define a straightforward process for
efficiently structuring high-grade information security evaluations.
1. Begin with a block or circuit diagram of the device and identify all red data sources
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(i.e., data sources in the high-security domain, including those within the device
itself) and relevant data sinks (i.e., those leading to the low-security domain).
2. Apply the path-traversal technique from Section 4.1 to eliminate components that do
not connect red data sources to low-security data sinks.
3. Find a minimal cutset, as described in Section 4.2, which partitions the data sources
and sinks, and thus identifies the component(s) to be examined first.
4. Examine each of the components in the chosen cutset:
(a) If all the components in the cutset can be shown to block propagation of red
data, then the device is secure and the evaluation is complete.
(b) Otherwise, substitute the results of the component evaluations back into the
diagram, and return to step 2.
5 Discussion
For the purposes of illustration, we assumed above that ‘control’ information is not of secu-
rity relevance, and we thus did not consider ‘red control’ signals in the security argument.
This is often a reasonable assumption in practice. For instance, ‘comparison logic’ circuitG
in the cryptographic device actually has two ‘data’ inputs, from microprocessorsD and E,
and produces a ‘control’ output, to ‘shutdown logic’ circuit C (Graves 2003). Each of the
inputs consists of an (encrypted) eight-bit character, whereas the output consists of a single
binary signal only. Therefore, even if the microprocessors failed to encrypt their outputs,
and the inputs to circuit G thus carried classified information, there is still comparatively
little information flow through the circuit.
Nevertheless, the assumption that control signals are of no interest is not necessarily
true in the field of covert channel analysis (Bishop 2003). One of the goals of covert
channel analyses is to determine whether or not information can be conveyed in ways unin-
tended by the device’s designer, including via ‘control’ signals. Fortunately, the techniques
we described above can be readily adapted to covert channel analyses, simply by treating
‘control’ connections to be as important as ‘data’ ones. For instance, in a covert channel
scenario, switches I and L would both be treated as red information sources, modelling
the (highly unlikely!) situation where classified information is leaked to the low-security
domain via the pattern of operation of these switches. For example, someone in the low-
security network could conceivably detect the interruption to the flow of characters caused
by the operator flicking the ‘fault insert’ switch.
Another way in which this work could be extended would be to separate the analysis
into different cases for different operating modes of the device. Certain components and
connections could be included or excluded depending on whether or not they are expected
to be active in certain modes. For devices with a number of distinct modes, this would
make the overall evaluation clearer and easier because the evaluator would need to consider
information flow in only one situation at a time.
6 Conclusion
High-grade information security evaluations are difficult and expensive. We have shown
how the process can be made more efficient by applying simple, well-known graph analysis
techniques to both eliminate components that do not need to be evaluated at all, and to
choose those components whose evaluation is most likely to lead to the quickest outcome.
In the case study, over half of the device’s components were eliminated from consideration,
without the need to gain a detailed understanding of their function at all.
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Importantly, the techniques for eliminating and prioritising components in Sections 4.1
and 4.2 are readily automatable. Indeed, we have already developed a prototype tool that
allows device diagrams to be entered graphically and then applies the techniques described
above to highlight those components worthy of evaluation.
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